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Abstract
Policy makers and governments are calling for coordination to address the crisis emerging from the ineffectiveness
of current antibiotics and stagnated pipe-line of new ones – antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Wider contextual drivers and
mechanisms are contributing to shifts in governance strategies in health care, but are national health system approaches
aligned with strategies required to tackle antimicrobial resistance? This article provides an analysis of governance
approaches within healthcare systems including: priority setting, performance monitoring and accountability for
AMR prevention in three European countries: England, France and Germany. Advantages and unresolved issues
from these different experiences are reported, concluding that mechanisms are needed to support partnerships
between healthcare professionals and patients with democratized decision-making and accountability via collaboration.
But along with this multi-stakeholder approach to governance, a balance between regulation and persuasion is needed.
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Background
The global challenge of antimicrobial resistance (AMR)
requires coordination across governments, country borders,
health and non-health sectors to maintain effectiveness of
antimicrobials [1–3]. Effective governance has emerged as a
crucial attribute deemed essential for sustained healthcare
system performance and safety [4, 5]. To address AMR, ef-
fective governance needs to extend wider than considering
just human health, including agriculture and animal health,
but the coordination of efforts to manage inappropriate use
of antibiotics within human health still requires much work
[6–8]. Approaches to governance to address AMR serve
as a test bed for health system governance more widely
when thinking about specific and complex public health
challenges.
The issue of AMR cuts across health conditions,
organizations and professionals. It is estimated that
around 700,000 people die each year from drug resistant
infections and experts predict an alarming increase to 10
million lives each year by 2050 [2]. AMR threatens the
practice of basic surgical procedures as well as advance-
ments in medicine, as there are now high proportions of
AMR in bacteria that cause common infections [6]. A key
component of addressing AMR is to prevent health care
associated infections; infections that develop as a direct
result of medical or surgical treatment or contact in a
healthcare setting [9].
The concept of health system governance in the health
policy literature refers to "the processes, structures and
organizational traditions that determine how power is
exercised, how stakeholders have their say, how decisions
are taken and how decision-makers are held to account"
[10]. As defined by the World Health Organization, health
sector governance refers to “a wide range of steering and
rule-making related functions carried out by governments/
decision makers as they seek to achieve national health
policy objectives that are conducive to universal health
coverage” [11]. This all-encompassing concept involves
a complex mix of activities and political processes which
collectively shape overall vision, strategy, and leadership
approaches, intended to provide system wide assurance
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and stewardship [12]. In the last decade, a change in gov-
ernance approaches is evident in many western healthcare
systems. The shift in public perceptions from a position of
full or assumed trust in healthcare professionals (HCPs) to
a more critical stance has required increased transparency
and accountability of individual and organizational per-
formance [13]. In the context of healthcare-associated
infections and antimicrobial resistance (AMR), such de-
mands have been coupled with a reduced acceptance of
events leading to harm [14]. But performance in infection
prevention and control and antimicrobial prescribing
across high, middle and low income countries remains
sub-optimal. These societal changes, together with wider
political and economic imperatives demand a rethink in
terms of the governance approaches required to sustain
effectiveness of antimicrobials [15, 16].
The inter-connected drivers of AMR and the complexity
of patient pathways across and between community, pri-
mary and secondary care mean that no organisation in iso-
lation can bring about the necessary impact. Regardless of
national context, AMR is the result of a complex causal
chain of structural factors and behaviours of the many indi-
viduals involved in patient care [17]. As locating individual
practice which contributes to AMR is almost impossible,
there has been a concerted shift in management practices
towards shared responsibility between HCPs and patients
[18]. In addition, policies have worked towards raising
the profile of AMR, ensuring that prevention methods are
evidence-based, and that systems of governance and ac-
countability within healthcare organizations are sound [19].
At the individual country level, even within Europe,
approaches to governance for the prevention of AMR vary
in terms of the stakeholders involved and extent of regula-
tion. Describing the landscape of healthcare governance
and comparing strategies adopted by different countries
can help to shape coordinated prevention and control
of AMR at a global scale. This review therefore aims to
examine some key theoretical concepts drawn from the
public and health policy literatures to help us explore
underpinning governance approaches for AMR preven-
tion (emergence and spread) in healthcare across three
European countries. By highlighting consistencies/diver-
gences in such governance approaches, the aim is to accel-
erate learning at the country and also the regional level.
A global threat requiring a re-look at governance approaches
As discussed above, the very nature of AMR as a policy
issue which is associated with complex relationships across
different industries and with various public agencies, as well
as society at large, is the first driver for re-examining and if
needed, updating governance approaches [1]. Strategies to
address AMR may need to take account of these multiple
sectors and players, and also be mindful of the wider
consequences of the strategies adopted [8]. For example,
the potential economic consequences of decreased product-
ivity by removing antibiotic use in livestock must be taken
into consideration when looking at the benefits of averting
disability related loss of productivity by preventing in-
fections in humans. A whole-systems perspective beyond
health care is required, and within health care, ensuring
strategy consistency across the whole health economy is
needed too [2, 20].
Countries and actors (health and non-health providers)
across each country are increasingly interdependent, act-
ing as nodes of networks with multiple interactions. Social
media and emerging technologies may have served, in
essence, to help democratise engagement of citizens in
governance and move it towards a co-production role
by facilitating the whole-of-society (and not just experts)
in creating and sharing knowledge and establishing rela-
tions between citizens, and citizens and experts, to main-
tain and preserve health (collaborative approach).
Having outlined our approach to analysing AMR as a
health policy issue, we now describe our empirical methods.
A documentary analysis for this paper was conducted by
four researchers (GB, RA, EF and ECS) followed by expert
input from AMR specialists (JCL, PG, SH and AH) for their
knowledge of the international and national contexts. For
each country, a documentary review of regulations/policies/
guidelines and media coverage was conducted over the last
15 years using archival data of previous research conducted
by the research team [20, 21]. Sources which enabled the
authors to chart the trajectory of governance in the areas of
IPC and AMR were accessed for data retrieval. Additional
sources were included using a hand search and input of
experts to update the existing database of sources from
the published and grey literature. In total, 79 secondary
sources were accessed. Expert input was also used to
validate the emerging analysis using the analytical and
theoretical framework described below.
Conceptual framework of analysis: The health policy
system and the AMR issue
The complex nature of system governance in this im-
portant AMR policy field may be helpfully analysed and
understood by looking at (i) the overall health system
level and (ii) the nature of a particular public health
issue – in this case IPC and AMR, and indeed how these
two levels of analysis interact. Differences in approaches
within countries can be observed in this way as well as
between countries. Our approach to analysis was informed
by Smith et al. who seek to explore questions of the how,
and who of three main governance processes, namely set-
ting priorities, monitoring performance against these pri-
orities, and accountability of all actors within the system
for their expected contribution [5].
Our conceptual analysis was also informed by two
main governance approaches observable in the public
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and health policy literatures (i) the exercise of top down
power through hierarchy or (ii) more network govern-
ance approaches which include bottom up concepts of
democratisation and collaboration, to provide insights
into how the key characteristics of such policy systems
may experience ‘evolution’ over time [22–24].
The traditional approach: Top down power through
hierarchy
In many high income countries, the prevailing approach
to AMR and infection prevention and control (IPC)
governance remains characterised as hierarchical forms
of power distribution and authority [25]. This hierarchical
approach is based on a unique locus of control and direc-
tives (command) by high level authorities with standards
backed by sanctions and rewards. Such top-down systems
include elements of AMR surveillance as well as external
mandates, and these may have acted as catalysts for
change. Hierarchical monitoring can stimulate action by
steering healthcare teams toward a shared objective which
has been prioritised through (usually) external agencies.
Willingness to accept suggested interventions with a new
collective responsibility can help existing motivation for
change through to progress [26]. Along with these positive
aspects, in the case of AMR, this governance strategy can
produce several side effects: tunnel vision by focusing all
efforts on a single intervention (e.g. hand hygiene) rather
than other equally valuable issues (e.g. antimicrobial stew-
ardship); mistrust, tensions between the different actors
[27]. Ironically, these actors can react to close surveillance
by “gaming” the system, for example resulting in an
under-notification of cases [28]. This hierarchical govern-
ance approach faces many challenges in addition to these,
emanating from the wider societal context. Hierarchical
approaches may be slow and limited in response to the
fast pace of change from globalization, information dis-
semination (speed and methods), the role of the private
sector and citizens’ expectations [19].
Democratisation and collaboration as an emergent
governance model.
Partly in recognition of the limitations of top down ap-
proaches to public policy, some public policy authors
[24] have explored what can be called new ‘network
governance’ approaches. Within network governance, cen-
tral government takes a less directive and more shaping
role. There is more bottom up influence from civil society,
Non-Governmental Organizations, active user groups and
also public private collaborations.
Within the specific policy field of AMR, maintaining
benefit to individual patients without compromising so-
cietal health and organizational viability (notably that of
pharmaceutical companies) will require reframing solu-
tions toward “shared value” approaches [18]. This objective
requires (from a network governance prism) multi-level,
multi-stakeholder approaches including government,
private sector and civil society (including active bottom up
influence from patient groups).
Public-private partnerships may contribute significantly
to maintain the effectiveness of antimicrobials but will re-
quire reorientation of basic premises of system governance.
As an example, in 2014, the European Union’s Innovative
Medicines Initiative (IMI) launched a campaign to bring a
complex mix of academic, biotech organisations and in-
dustry researchers together to work on the problem of
AMR. This programme named “NewDrugs4BadBugs”,
brings partners together to contribute not just for new
molecular discoveries and antibiotic production, but
also fast-tracking development in point of care testing
for diagnosis, and at the same time looking for new
business models of incentives for organisations and the
industries involved. [29]. The programme has implemented
an unprecedented sharing of knowledge, but equally must
be supported by effective governance systems within and
across industries and countries to assure the public interest
is protected. .
New ways of healthcare governance now being adopted
for assuring the quality of care and patient safety involve
expert bodies and also user representatives [30]. This multi-
stakeholder approach addresses the complexity of AMR
through horizontal diffusion and decentralization of func-
tions at all layers of the healthcare system and organizations
within it. This evolution is toward a more democratic and
collaborative process rather than authoritarian rules. It has
the potential to change lines of accountability, increase in-
formation flows and involves users in new ways.
Given the potential scope and magnitude of impact of
AMR on modern medicine and surgery and its high im-
portance as a health policy issue, we therefore argue
governance approaches could be driven in two alterna-
tive directions: either a move to tighten controls through
the conventional hierarchical approach, or harnessing
mixed models including market and collaborative net-
work modes [5].
Governance approaches within and across
countries
England
Overall health system governance
England has a centralized health system administered
through the publicly funded National Health Service (NHS)
(Table 1). In other parts of the UK (Scotland and Wales),
health policy is a devolved matter, but the English regions
have no such competence. Within England, priorities are
centrally set by the Department of Health (DH), which sets
out objectives for hospitals which are then operationalised
through NHS England as a national managerial agency. Im-
provement campaigns are shaped by national institutions
Birgand et al. Antimicrobial Resistance and Infection Control  (2018) 7:28 Page 3 of 12
Ta
b
le
1
Su
m
m
ar
y
of
he
al
th
an
d
IP
C
/A
M
R
go
ve
rn
an
ce
in
th
e
th
re
e
in
cl
ud
ed
co
un
tr
ie
s
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
cr
ite
ria
de
fin
ed
by
Sm
ith
et
al
[5
]
En
gl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
ov
er
na
nc
e
m
od
el
•
N
at
io
na
lH
ea
lth
Se
rv
ic
es
(N
H
S)
:
ce
nt
ra
lly
pl
an
ne
d
he
al
th
sy
st
em
•
A
M
R:
H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
lw
ith
au
th
or
ita
tiv
e
pr
es
su
re
of
D
H
•
C
en
tr
al
-le
ve
lg
ov
er
na
nc
e
m
od
el
ba
se
d
on
ce
nt
ra
lg
ov
er
nm
en
t
le
ad
in
g
an
d
se
tt
in
g
di
re
ct
io
ns
fo
r
th
e
he
al
th
ca
re
sy
st
em
.
•
A
M
R:
H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
lo
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
w
ith
au
th
or
ita
tiv
e
pr
es
su
re
of
th
e
m
in
is
tr
y
of
he
al
th
an
d
th
e
Re
gi
on
al
ag
en
cy
of
he
al
th
•
Fe
de
ra
lg
ov
er
nm
en
t
w
ith
co
rp
or
at
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
an
d
th
e
he
lp
of
ag
en
ci
es
•
W
ag
e-
re
la
te
d
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
•
16
fe
de
ra
ls
ta
te
s
(L
än
de
rs
)
w
ith
th
ei
r
ow
n
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
•
A
M
R:
na
tio
na
la
nd
fe
de
ra
l
H
ow
pr
io
rit
ie
s
ar
e
se
t
fo
r
im
pr
ov
in
g
ac
tio
ns
an
d
st
an
da
rd
s?
W
ho
is
in
vo
lv
ed
&
w
ha
t
is
th
e
ro
le
?
•
Th
e
D
H
&
C
ar
e
Q
ua
lit
y
C
om
m
is
si
on
se
ts
ta
rg
et
s
an
d
pu
ts
in
pl
ac
e
th
e
O
ut
co
m
es
Fr
am
ew
or
k;
Pr
ov
id
in
g
su
pp
or
t,
gu
id
an
ce
,l
eg
is
la
tio
n,
an
d
C
od
e
of
Pr
ac
tic
e.
•
N
IC
E:
pr
ov
id
e
cl
in
ic
al
gu
id
an
ce
.
•
M
in
is
tr
y
of
H
ea
lth
vi
a
na
tio
na
la
ge
nc
ie
s:
Te
ch
ni
ca
lc
om
m
itt
ee
(H
ig
h
co
un
ci
lo
f
pu
bl
ic
he
al
th
),
po
lic
y
gr
ou
p
(C
os
u
Pr
op
ia
s)
,
th
e
in
te
rm
in
is
te
ria
lc
om
m
itt
ee
fo
r
he
al
th
de
di
ca
te
d
to
A
M
R
•
Re
gi
on
al
ag
en
cy
of
H
ea
lth
:s
pe
ll
ou
t
cr
ite
ria
an
d
ta
rg
et
s
fo
r
th
e
pr
ov
is
io
n
of
ca
re
.
•
Bu
nd
es
m
in
is
te
riu
m
fü
r
G
es
un
dh
ei
t
(B
M
G
;F
ed
er
al
M
in
is
tr
y
of
H
ea
lth
)
•
Th
e
C
om
m
is
si
on
of
H
os
pi
ta
lh
yg
ie
ne
an
d
In
fe
ct
io
n
pr
ev
en
tio
n
(K
RI
N
KO
)
at
th
e
Ro
be
rt
Ko
ch
-In
st
itu
te
(R
KI
)
•
Po
ss
ib
ili
ty
of
lo
ca
lp
rio
rit
y
se
tt
in
g
by
fe
de
ra
ls
ta
te
s
W
ha
t
is
th
e
ev
id
en
ce
ba
se
fo
r
de
ci
sio
n-
m
ak
in
g?
•
H
ea
lth
te
ch
no
lo
gy
as
se
ss
m
en
t
(ra
tio
na
la
rg
um
en
ts
)
•
H
ea
lth
te
ch
no
lo
gy
as
se
ss
m
en
t
(ra
tio
na
l
ar
gu
m
en
ts
)
•
H
ea
lth
te
ch
no
lo
gy
as
se
ss
m
en
t
(ra
tio
na
la
rg
um
en
ts
)
W
ha
t
ar
e
th
e
m
ai
n
st
re
ng
th
s
•
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
of
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
to
pu
bl
ic
•
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
m
an
ag
em
en
t
ap
pr
oa
ch
:
Em
ph
as
is
on
st
ru
ct
ur
al
an
d
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
al
as
pe
ct
s.
•
Re
la
tiv
el
y
st
ro
ng
de
gr
ee
of
de
le
ga
te
d
an
d
au
to
no
m
ou
s
de
ci
si
on
m
ak
in
g.
W
ha
t
ar
e
th
e
m
ai
n
w
ea
kn
es
se
s?
•
D
iff
ic
ul
tie
s
to
co
nv
er
t
na
tio
na
l
go
al
s
in
to
lo
ca
lp
ra
ct
ic
es
•
N
at
io
na
lt
ar
ge
ts
le
d
to
lo
ca
l
an
om
al
ie
s
an
d
un
su
st
ai
na
bl
e
•
Pa
tie
nt
ro
le
no
t
w
el
ld
ef
in
ed
.
•
C
os
t-
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
an
al
ys
is
st
ud
ie
s
no
t
av
ai
la
bl
e
•
Po
or
co
st
-e
ffe
ct
iv
en
es
s
an
al
ys
is
•
W
ea
k
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
lp
ow
er
s.
D
ec
is
io
ns
po
ss
ib
ly
bl
oc
ke
d
by
no
ng
ov
er
nm
en
ta
la
nd
co
ul
d
de
la
y
th
e
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
of
pr
io
rit
ie
s
•
Ri
sk
of
so
m
ew
ha
t
ar
bi
tr
ar
y
go
al
s
by
ag
en
ci
es
.
H
ow
is
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
m
on
ito
re
d?
By
w
ho
m
?
•
D
H
an
d
PH
E
(N
IN
SS
):
N
at
io
na
l
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e.
•
N
H
S
Im
pr
ov
em
en
t
(fo
rm
er
ly
th
e
M
on
ito
r):
In
te
rv
en
e
if
co
nc
er
ns
ab
ou
t
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
of
N
H
S
fo
un
da
tio
n
tr
us
ts
.
•
C
ar
e
Q
ua
lit
y
C
om
m
is
si
on
:
In
sp
ec
tio
ns
an
d
as
se
ss
m
en
ts
of
N
H
S
(fo
un
da
tio
n)
tr
us
ts
re
ga
rd
in
g
na
tio
na
lo
bj
ec
tiv
es
.
•
M
in
is
tr
y
of
H
ea
lth
:m
an
da
to
ry
in
di
ca
to
rs
w
ith
pu
bl
ic
re
po
rt
in
g.
•
H
ig
h
A
ut
ho
rit
y
of
H
ea
lth
(H
A
S)
:h
os
pi
ta
l
ce
rt
ifi
ca
tio
n.
•
Pu
bl
ic
H
ea
lth
of
Fr
an
ce
an
d
5
in
te
rr
eg
io
na
l
co
or
di
na
tin
g
ce
nt
re
s:
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e
(R
A
IS
IN
)
fo
r
be
nc
hm
ar
ki
ng
.
•
IQ
TI
Q
:F
ed
er
al
in
st
itu
te
fo
r
qu
al
ity
m
an
ag
em
en
t,
qu
al
ity
re
po
rt
ea
ch
ye
ar
on
fe
de
ra
ll
ev
el
(fo
rm
er
ly
A
Q
U
A
in
st
itu
te
).
•
N
at
io
na
lR
ef
er
en
ce
C
en
tr
e
fo
r
Su
rv
ei
lla
nc
ce
(N
at
io
na
le
s
Re
fe
re
nz
ze
nt
ru
m
fü
r
Su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e
vo
n
no
so
ko
m
ia
le
n
In
fe
kt
io
ne
n,
N
RZ
).
Fu
nd
ed
by
th
e
BM
G
,I
ts
ac
tiv
iti
es
le
d
to
th
e
cr
ea
tio
n
of
a
na
tio
na
l
no
so
co
m
ia
li
nf
ec
tio
n
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e
sy
st
em
en
tit
le
d
Kr
an
ke
nh
au
s-
In
fe
kt
io
ns
-S
ur
ve
ill
an
ce
Sy
st
em
(K
IS
S)
.
H
ow
an
d
w
ha
t
ar
e
th
e
m
ai
n
st
re
ng
th
s
an
d
w
ea
kn
es
se
s?
•
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
m
an
ag
em
en
t
ap
pr
oa
ch
:m
an
da
to
ry
in
di
ca
to
rs
w
ith
pu
bl
ic
re
po
rt
in
g.
Pe
na
lti
es
an
d
fin
es
.
•
Em
po
w
er
pa
tie
nt
s.
•
C
re
at
io
n
a
cu
ltu
re
of
fe
ar
fu
ln
es
s
an
d
op
en
up
th
e
po
ss
ib
ili
tie
s
of
ga
m
in
g.
•
Tu
nn
el
vi
si
on
.
•
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
m
an
ag
em
en
t
ap
pr
oa
ch
:
m
an
da
to
ry
in
di
ca
to
rs
w
ith
pu
bl
ic
re
po
rt
in
g.
•
Tu
nn
el
vi
si
on
.
•
M
an
da
to
ry
fo
r
ho
sp
ita
ls
to
su
rv
ey
no
so
co
m
ia
l
in
fe
ct
io
ns
in
hi
gh
-r
is
k
ar
ea
s
(n
eo
na
ta
lI
C
U
s)
an
d
to
re
co
rd
em
er
gi
ng
m
ul
ti-
re
si
st
an
t
no
so
co
m
ia
l
pa
th
og
en
s.
•
N
at
io
nw
id
e
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e
of
no
so
co
m
ia
li
nf
ec
tio
ns
,
m
ul
ti-
re
si
st
an
t
no
so
co
m
ia
lp
at
ho
ge
ns
an
d
al
co
ho
lic
ha
nd
s
ru
b
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
in
G
er
m
an
y.
Birgand et al. Antimicrobial Resistance and Infection Control  (2018) 7:28 Page 4 of 12
Ta
b
le
1
Su
m
m
ar
y
of
he
al
th
an
d
IP
C
/A
M
R
go
ve
rn
an
ce
in
th
e
th
re
e
in
cl
ud
ed
co
un
tr
ie
s
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
cr
ite
ria
de
fin
ed
by
Sm
ith
et
al
[5
]
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
En
gl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
H
ow
is
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
fo
r
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
en
su
re
d?
H
ow
ar
e
th
e
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s
in
pl
ac
e
lin
ke
d
to
th
e
he
al
th
sy
st
em
’s
br
oa
de
r
go
ve
rn
an
ce
st
ru
ct
ur
es
?
•
D
ire
ct
in
ce
nt
iv
es
th
ro
ug
h
m
an
ag
er
ia
lc
on
tr
ol
.
•
Fi
na
nc
ia
lp
re
ss
ur
e
on
co
nt
ra
ct
s.
•
Pu
bl
ic
re
le
as
e
of
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
da
ta
,i
nf
or
m
ed
by
go
al
s
an
d
pr
io
rit
ie
s,
an
d
se
rv
in
g
a
m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
pr
oc
es
s.
•
D
ire
ct
in
ce
nt
iv
es
th
ro
ug
h
m
an
ag
er
ia
lc
on
tr
ol
.
•
Pu
bl
ic
re
le
as
e
of
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
da
ta
,i
nf
or
m
ed
by
go
al
s
an
d
pr
io
rit
ie
s,
an
d
se
rv
in
g
a
m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
pr
oc
es
s.
•
Fi
na
nc
ia
lp
en
al
tie
s
fo
r
no
t
re
po
rt
in
g
da
ta
•
St
at
ut
or
y
an
d
vo
lu
nt
ar
y
ac
cr
ed
ita
tio
n
sc
he
m
es
,
at
th
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
la
nd
pr
ac
tit
io
ne
r
le
ve
l,
an
d
th
e
fre
ed
om
of
pa
tie
nt
s
to
ch
oo
se
pr
ov
id
er
.
•
C
on
fid
en
tia
lr
ep
or
tin
g
of
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e
da
ta
Ar
e
th
e
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s
ef
fe
ct
iv
e?
•
In
cr
ea
si
ng
pr
es
su
re
fo
r
ho
sp
ita
ls
to
pr
od
uc
e
an
d
fil
e
pl
an
s
fo
r
co
nt
ro
la
ct
iv
iti
es
w
ith
he
al
th
au
th
or
iti
es
.
•
In
cr
ea
si
ng
te
nd
en
cy
fo
r
ho
sp
ita
l
an
d
bo
ar
ds
to
be
su
bj
ec
t
to
au
di
t.
•
St
ro
ng
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
st
ru
ct
ur
e
in
ho
sp
ita
lt
ru
st
s.
•
N
o
st
ro
ng
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
st
ru
ct
ur
e.
•
W
ea
k
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
la
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
.
To
w
ha
t
ex
te
nt
ar
e
th
e
th
re
e
co
m
po
ne
nt
s
al
ig
ne
d?
•
Br
oa
d
na
tio
na
lg
oa
ls
m
us
t
tr
an
sl
at
e
in
to
ac
hi
ev
ab
le
lo
ca
lt
ar
ge
ts
.
•
Po
ss
ib
le
co
nf
lic
t
be
tw
ee
n
na
tio
na
l
an
d
lo
ca
lp
rio
rit
ie
s.
•
Br
oa
d
na
tio
na
lg
oa
ls
m
us
t
tr
an
sl
at
e
in
to
ac
hi
ev
ab
le
lo
ca
lt
ar
ge
ts
.
•
Po
ss
ib
le
co
nf
lic
t
be
tw
ee
n
na
tio
na
la
nd
lo
ca
lp
rio
rit
ie
s.
•
La
ck
of
ca
pa
ci
ty
an
d
co
or
di
na
tio
n,
te
ch
ni
ca
ld
iff
ic
ul
tie
s.
•
C
ap
tu
re
by
po
w
er
fu
lv
es
te
d
in
te
re
st
s.
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
ns
:N
H
S
N
at
io
na
lH
ea
lth
Se
rv
ic
e,
A
M
R
an
tim
ic
ro
bi
al
re
si
st
an
ce
,D
H
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t
of
H
ea
lth
,N
IC
E
N
at
io
na
lI
ns
tit
ut
e
fo
r
H
ea
lth
an
d
C
ar
e
Ex
ce
lle
nc
e,
PH
E
Pu
bl
ic
H
ea
lth
En
gl
an
d,
N
IN
SS
N
os
oc
om
ia
lI
nf
ec
tio
n
N
at
io
na
lS
ur
ve
ill
an
ce
Sy
st
em
,P
ro
pi
as
,P
ro
gr
am
m
e
na
tio
na
ld
e
pr
év
en
tio
n
de
s
in
fe
ct
io
ns
as
so
ci
ée
s
au
x
so
in
s,
KR
IN
KO
C
om
m
is
si
on
of
H
os
pi
ta
lh
yg
ie
ne
an
d
In
fe
ct
io
n
pr
ev
en
tio
n,
RK
IR
ob
er
t
Ko
ch
-In
st
itu
te
,I
Q
W
IQ
Fe
de
ra
l
in
st
itu
te
fo
r
qu
al
ity
m
an
ag
em
en
t,
A
Q
U
A
In
st
itu
te
fo
r
A
pp
lie
d
Q
ua
lit
y
Im
pr
ov
em
en
t
an
d
Re
se
ar
ch
in
H
ea
lth
C
ar
e
G
m
bH
,N
RZ
N
at
io
na
le
s
Re
fe
re
nz
ze
nt
ru
m
fü
r
Su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e
vo
n
no
so
ko
m
ia
le
n
In
fe
kt
io
ne
n,
BM
G
Fe
de
ra
l
M
in
is
tr
y
of
H
ea
lth
-
Bu
nd
es
m
in
is
te
ri
um
fü
r
G
es
un
dh
ei
t,
KI
SS
Kr
an
ke
nh
au
s-
In
fe
kt
io
ns
-S
ur
ve
ill
an
ce
Sy
st
em
,I
CU
in
te
ns
iv
e
ca
re
un
it
Birgand et al. Antimicrobial Resistance and Infection Control  (2018) 7:28 Page 5 of 12
including the DH and local organizations (e.g. clinical
commissioning groups). Public Health England (PHE,
executive agency of the DH), supports local authorities
in their duty to improve public health and reports annu-
ally on their progress. Performance monitoring is accom-
plished by centralised regulatory bodies (e.g. Care Quality
Commission; NHS Improvement) National bodies (e.g.
PHE) manage surveillance data and give advice on global or
local trends and threats. In 2016, “NHS Improvement” was
created as a powerful central regulator to take responsibility
for overseeing foundation trusts and NHS trusts, as well as
independent providers that provide NHS care, and hold
providers to account for performance. Aims include the
provision of support providers by giving information on
their performance, reforming payment mechanisms and
increasing patient involvement. In NHS foundation trusts,
the board of directors is held to account by the council of
governors composed of elected members (i.e. patient/user/
carer, public and staff governors), and appointed key stake-
holders [28]. NHS (Foundation) trusts are accountable
to the Secretary of State for Health. Local authorities are
now responsible for promoting public health of their local
population. Recent policy has focused on ensuring market
accountability up to the regulator with heavy top down
control of the local financial deficits emerging in NHS
Trusts. The system as a whole can be seen as generally
top down in nature, with strong setting and monitoring of
targets and performance indicators for local Trusts from
the centre.
Governance for prevention of AMR in healthcare settings
The control of AMR is also highly centralised with national
initiatives and commitments. Priorities for AMR prevention
are set at the national level by the DH with a five year
strategy [31]. Locally agreed ‘stretch’ targets (ie. to be
achieved over an agreed timeframe requiring systemic
improvements) for methicillin resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) (alongside national targets) were intro-
duced in 2008 [32]. In 2013, the Chief Medical Officer’s
annual report on the rise of AMR galvanized nation-wide
focus [33]. In 2016, the government mandate to NHS
2016/17 clearly specified the need to support ambitions to
prevent AMR [34]. Performance is monitored at the na-
tional level by mandatory surveillance. Efforts started in
2001 with the surveillance of MRSA first mandated as a
core performance indicator for NHS trusts, followed by
other blood stream infections including Glycopeptide-
resistant Enterococci (GRE). In 2013 a “zero tolerance
approach” to MRSA was initiated, with mandatory post
infection review for each MRSA case [35]. The trajectory
hence has been of increasing regulatory controls [20]. In
2014, PHE initiated the English surveillance programme for
antimicrobial utilisation and resistance (ESPAUR) [36]. The
structure of accountability is based on public reporting of
national target indicators for individual hospitals. Financial
penalties for MRSA cases were introduced in 2014 [37].
In 2016, PHE launched an open access portal of public
health outcome indicators by geographic region and hospital
(“fingertips” [38]) with AMR local indicators searchable
down to hospital level. In 2017, this open access site in-
corporated primary care organisations, with antibiotic
prescribing at general practice level available in the public
domain for the first time. Reporting of antibiotic steward-
ship programme implementation at this more granular level
is also set to follow. This demonstrates a move toward more
comparative and transparent performance indicators and
not just confined to hospitals.
France
Overall health system governance
The French system is characterized by strong state regu-
lation. In 2009, France initiated multi-level governance
by empowering local regions to take a more integrated
approach towards health financing and the delivery of
care. Priorities are established at the national level by an
assembly of experts gathered under the close supervision
of the ministry of health (MoH). Performance monitoring
is conducted by the MoH and national agencies such as
Public Health France (PHF) created in 2016 to simplify
and harmonise existing agencies. Regulation, inspections
and control are routinely performed mainly at the regional
level (Agence Régionale de Santé) and every four years
by independent national health authority agencies (Haute
Autorité de Santé, HAS), under the supervision of the
MoH. In 2015, the health system was reformed significantly
with the Health Act (Loi santé), centred on the whole
patient pathway rather than a succession of interventions
and providers, for collective accountability of financial and
social consequences.
Governance for prevention of AMR in healthcare settings
Priorities are set at the national level by the MoH through a
commission of experts. The policy is nationally driven by
the PHF, and locally coordinated by regional authorities. In
2015, a national task force produced a report for the MoH
giving a detailed timeline to reduce mortality due to AMR
and of antibiotic consumption [39]. This report led to the
creation of an intra-government committee dedicated to
addressing AMR (across health/finance/agriculture/envir-
onment ministries). The recent national program (Propias)
details specific targets for AMR prevention at national and
local levels, orientated toward primary care and patient in-
volvement [40]. Performance is monitored by a mandatory
national notification system and nationally set indicators
(alcohol-based hand rub consumption, antibiotic steward-
ship, and MRSA rates) under the supervision of PHF. A
national network of voluntary reporting of multidrug-
resistant organisms (MDROs) and antibiotic use (RAISIN)
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has been in operation since 1998. This is a confidential
reporting and feedback system for benchmarking [41, 42].
The accountability function is performed by the public
reporting of national indicators, available on the MoH
website and newspapers. A financial penalty was introduced
in 2010 for hospitals failing to publicise mandated in-
dicators [43].
Germany
Overall health system governance
In Germany, responsibility for the health system is divided
between central government, the federal states and self-
governing bodies. The Federal Joint Committee (G-BA)
established in 2004 is the paramount priority setting body
and takes responsibility for assessing the quality and effi-
ciency of care. The German States (“Länder”) are respon-
sible for the local implementation of G-BA priorities, with
the jurisdiction to enact their own additional priorities. In
2009, the G-BA commissioned the AQUA Institute, an
independent and impartial corporation, to implement
nationwide cross-sectoral healthcare quality assurance.
AQUA took responsibility for wide-scale performance
reporting in an anonymized way, associated analysis,
following up with underperforming providers. Such follow
up includes request for a written report from hospitals to
explain under performance (e.g., case-mix). If the AQUA is
not satisfied with the report provided, the case is referred
for external review to provide recommendations toward
improvement. This whole procedure is called the “struc-
tured dialogue” (in German “Strukturierter Dialog”), sug-
gesting norms of consensus building rather than top down
directives. In 2014 the G-BA established the Institute for
Applied Quality Improvement and Transparency in Health
Care (IQTIG), an independent national agency contracted
solely by the Federal Ministry of Health and the G-BA
for the development of measures for quality assurance
against which hospitals report. IQTIG is responsible for
disseminating these quality reports, but the format and
scope of this dissemination is yet to be agreed. It is not
yet known when or how reports will be available in the
public domain. According to IQTIQ´s specifications, hospi-
tals are now required to publish various quality indicators
in their annual mandatory quality report. Accountability is
ensured through these various statutory and voluntary ac-
creditation schemes, at the organizational and practitioner
level, and the freedom of patients to choose provider.
Governance for prevention of AMR in healthcare settings
At the Federal level, the key legal instruments for the
surveillance, monitoring and prevention of AMR are
defined in the Protection Against Infection Act (IfSG).
The German States (“Länder”) have in some cases also is-
sued supplementary regulations. Consistent implementa-
tion of legal targets by enforcement agencies, and by the
responsible players in medical institutions, makes an essen-
tial contribution to achieving the central goal of the strat-
egy. Priorities for AMR prevention are set at different
levels, nationally with the German Antimicrobial Resistance
Strategy (DART 2008 updated 2015) and regionally by
networks created in 2004 with the support of the Robert
Koch Institute [44]. National performance monitoring started
in 2002 when the IfSG enacted mandatory surveillance
by hospitals, of a defined set of MDROs [45]. Antibiotic
resistance surveillance followed in 2007, collecting data
on antibiotic resistance at the national level and
informing antibiotic stewardship efforts [46]. In 2009,
MRSA infections were mandatorily reported, followed
by strains of Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriacae
and Acinetobacter spp.(2016). In 2011, the IfSG expanded
its duties with continuous monitoring, surveillance and in-
terpretation of antibiotic consumption data in hospitals
(supported by the newly created Federal commissions and
surveillance systems managed by the Robert Koch Institute)
[47, 48]. Since 1997, a voluntary and confidential national
surveillance system (KISS) has been in operation for MRSA,
GRE, gram negative MDRO, and use of alcohol-based hand
rub [45]. Accountability is through the routine confidential
reporting of surveillance data for participating hospitals, as
described [49].
Convergence and divergence of approaches across the
countries
The three countries examined here all have formal mecha-
nisms of setting comprehensive and clear goals for the
health system. England and France have a vertical approach
by setting priorities at the national level by the MoH with
the advice of expert commissions. Policies are then nation-
ally driven by agencies.
The health and AMR policy trajectory in England has
been context specific and somewhat insular (even from
the other UK countries); some local pressures have in-
cluded the media, public and other political sources
which have further legitimised a hierarchical governance
approach [20] to governance in what is a highly centra-
lised and managerialized policy system.
Some cross-national translation is seen in the recent
creation of the PHF in France modelled on England’s inde-
pendent institution, PHE. France has however, recently
moved away from a top-down authoritative approach, to
softer, multi-level governance, through empowering regions
to take a more integrated approach in the financing and de-
livery of care. In Germany, the Federal states are historically
empowered to set local priorities in addition to national
ones. These devolved systems in France and Germany
however bring different risks, as local states, counties
or cantons have the freedom to depart from national
priorities limiting comparability. Differences in goal set-
ting and preventive strategies across localities can result
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in the spread of MDROs across regions (e.g. Länders)
and countries [50]. However, a decentralised governance
approach may provide possibilities for better monitoring
of antibiotic usage through creation of a dedicated struc-
ture to assess and monitor governance at these local levels
which is aligned with national, and international goals.
The three countries in the present review appear hetero-
geneous in their strategies of AMR prevention. A better
coordinated approach across countries may be beneficial.
But at the same time relevance to context and history is
important when suggesting new initiatives, for example
public reporting was implemented in England 3 and 5
years ahead of other European countries and very much
the norm; but is met with trepidation in less hierarchical
health systems (eg. Germany, Switzerland), demonstrating
the divergent contexts and potential work to be done if
policy makers attempt to align approaches across nations
with very different governance systems in health policy.
Common across the counties is a system of agencies
advising the MoH to set high-level goals and choose na-
tional priorities. The three countries have also taken a
similar route for performance monitoring but with different
timelines for mandatory and voluntary surveillance and a
different mix of indicators. In terms of accountability,
England and France appear to place most reliance on
transparent approaches open to public scrutiny, and regu-
lated by information and benchmarking. Germany care-
fully promotes market instruments but as a corporatist
healthcare system, the state takes a more passive role as a
regulator through legislation and defining a framework –
but providers and sickness funds act autonomously
[51, 52]. These collectives are thus delegated responsi-
bilities and achieve consensus through common need
and objectives (eg. providers, insurance funds). However, a
shift toward centralised public reporting is imminent fol-
lowing the establishment of comparable performance met-
rics. Observations arising from the analysis above may
inform the future direction for AMR prevention and im-
plications for health systems governance more generally.
Network governance
In 2013, the Science Ministers of the G8 agreed that AMR
demands an urgent global cross-sectoral response and re-
search considering animal and human health, economy,
industry, and the environment to accelerate improvements
[53]. This ‘one health’ approach requires the development
of collaborative approaches to governance; specifically
through network governance [16, 54]. Yet our analysis
shows that even within the healthcare context, a hier-
archical approach dominates and a misalignment within
country between the key dimensions of governance; priority
setting, performance monitoring and accountability. Net-
work governance requires shared ownership of goals,
but flexibility of process for sustained improvement. This
governance approach suggests that working together in-
creasingly consists of functioning within complex networks
rather than between clear hierarchical systems. It also
implies bridging diverse policy areas, professional fields,
academic disciplines, levels of governance (localities, states,
regions and global) and sectors of society (public, private
and civil). This approach was recently (2016) suggested in
‘The Review on AMR’ (often referred to as the “O’Neill
Report” – after the economist who was commissioned
to lead this review by the UK Prime Minister in 2014)
advocating a supra-national entity to set global priorities,
monitor performance and accountability [2]. Collaborative
governance can however fail when there are conflicts
between short term objectives, weak accountability, and
differing power relations amongst different professional
groups [55] (Table 2).
Participatory governance through empowerment and
involvement of healthcare users
A recent meeting of the European Union (EU) Council
recognised healthcare users’ empowerment and involve-
ment as an essential part of good quality and safety of
care [56]. Patients are both consumers choosing providers
of services, and citizens claiming empowerment and par-
ticipation in governance [57]. Success requires increased
participatory governance with empowerment and cooper-
ation of HCPs and patients. Transparency is crucial to gain
citizens’ trust and collaboration. The availability of accurate
and real-time information may, for example, help patients
to understand choices for antibiotics prescribing (according
to clinical signs and epidemiology) and IPC measures [58].
Tools such as smartphones and social media can empower
people by increasing access to information and facilitate
multi-way communication and engagement [59].
In such a participatory process, citizens’ views and prefer-
ences would be sought, debated and incorporated into ser-
vice provision recommendations. In a global matter such as
AMR, guideline development groups often include patient’s
representatives [60]. Through this process, HCPs and the
public are peers who jointly share the responsibility and
accountability of authoritative decision making. With their
emphasis on cooperation rather than managerial instruc-
tions, participatory approaches are more likely to diffuse
legitimated policies throughout society and thus promote
sustainability.
Governance mixing hierarchy and network organizations
Successful AMR control strategies require a multi-faceted
approach in which all relevant sectors of the healthcare sys-
tem are engaged. In 2002, the EU recommended to restrict
systemic antibacterial agents to prescription-only [61].
Some states relied on multi-lateral organizations to help
coordinate policy responses. Previous lack of such top-
down governance has contributed to a high proportion of
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antibiotics sold over the counter [62]. Both top-down
and horizontal governance are sometimes purposefully
employed together in complex multi-level organizations. A
softer side of top-down authority has emerged via multi-
level governance to promote self-regulation and growing
interest in what are referred to as ‘nudge’ policies [63]. Such
policies, based on behavioural science, political theory and
economics propose positive reinforcement and rather mod-
est indirect suggestions and triggers to try to achieve non-
forced compliance and to influence the motives, incentives
and decision making of groups and individuals. In short, to
make the safer choice the easier choice [64] but not to
command directly.
The rise of independent agencies and expert bodies
Participatory mechanisms can also be developed through
independent agencies, outside of government, but with
the capacity and remit to advise ministers through the
provision of evidence synthesis and scenario evaluation.
Examples include PHE in England and PHF in France,
charged with priority setting at the national level. These
agencies have responded to the increased demand for
information, the need for scientific and expert advice and
the need to facilitate new distributions of power. Open
consultations and the inclusion of professional and patient
associations in an advisory capacity are important mecha-
nisms for distributing knowledge and power more widely.
This agency approach represents a new mode of national
and international governance, making processes such as
risk assessment for health protection arguably more open,
objective and less political [65].
Adaptive and anticipatory governance
Surprise, instability and extraordinary changes are and
will be regular features of healthcare delivery. The emer-
gence of resistant organisms is constant. The control of
communicable diseases requires flexible and adaptable
system approaches. Self-organization and decentralized
decision-making can potentially allow the management
of major societal risk [66] (as in the case of AMR), more
efficiently through ensuring flexibility and the ability to
respond to unanticipated challenges. Simulation combined
with feedback loops and monitoring can possibly be power-
ful tools for illustrating possible future complex, multi-actor
issues and anticipating emerging situations [67]. Central
government’s use of information for guidance and control
though feedback as a means of inducing self-correcting be-
haviour at the organizational level (the cybernetic approach)
could support such adaptive management [68].
Conclusion and policy recommendations
We suggest that the characteristics of the English
health policy system generally, and also AMR policy
field specifically, diverge from those found in France and
Germany in some important ways. It is more top down,
more managerial and with a strong emphasis on the setting
and monitoring of targets and key performance indicators,
and the provision of performance data. An implication
is that it will not be easy to align governance systems
for AMR across the three countries as they reflect the
distinctive health policy fields found in each jurisdiction.
In each of the three countries analysed, key independent
organisations which deliver a public service, but that are
not ministerial government departments (referred to as
arm’s length agencies), are now strongly embedded and
accepted within the healthcare infrastructure. The roles of
these agencies include priority setting, performance moni-
toring and are hence a part of the accountability frame-
work. However, this triad of roles require better alignment
and also room for temporal and local adaptability. This in-
cludes: (i) consistent and clear priorities at the national
and local level, with autonomy at the local level (ii) the
implementation of meaningful and feasible measures to
improve performance which are not counter to other
quality improvement objectives and (iii) appropriate
mix of incentives and penalties. We observed a vari-
ation in setting priorities nationally in France/England
and at both national and federal levels in Germany.
Countries are also at different stages of performance
monitoring; with transparency through public reporting of
detailed indicators at opposite ends of the spectrum with
an ever-widening scope in England versus confidential
reporting (to date) in Germany. Finally, accountability
mechanisms appear to vary considerably between countries.
The optimal approach is difficult to design and requires a
mixed approach given the complexities of individual and
organisational behaviours. The effective implementation of
governance approaches may well require the extensive in-
volvement of various actors from the national to the front-
line level and a level of engagement with the issue of AMR
by the public; engagement strategies with the latter are cur-
rently not well understood. Agencies need to be mindful
that easily accessible and clear information is a prerequisite
for the adoption of new mechanisms of governance.
In this way, leaders do not dictate rules and monitor
compliance but help stakeholders to achieve shared goals
to maintain effectiveness of antimicrobials, mixing regula-
tion and persuasion. Network governance approaches are
in our view more likely to be legitimate and sustainable
than top down control.
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